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 Abstract 
 
This dissertation clarifies, discusses and elaborates on the method of Jürgen Habermas’ 
philosophical enterprise: rational reconstruction. The method is designed for a systematic 
reconstruction of the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects, as well as the collective 
knowledge of traditions. By explicating a normative content inherent in a set of different 
practices, a critical standard is established against which actual practices can be evaluated. 
 In the first article, Habermas’ method: Rational reconstruction I describe the method’s 
main features, and based on this outline I demonstrate how the method is employed in two of 
Habermas’ research programs: formal pragmatics and the theory of social evolution. In the 
second article, Habermas and the political sciences: on the relationship between theory and 
practice, I demonstrate how Habermas unites theory and practice through a mode of analysis 
which is descriptive and normative at the same time. I then proceed to show how the method 
is employed in Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy. 
 In the third article, Social philosophy: a reconstructive or deconstructive discipline, I 
present the method of rational reconstruction as a key factor in Habermas’ transformation of 
the original program Horkheimer established for critical theory in the early 1930s. 
Horkheimer claimed that social philosophy should be normative and descriptive and at the 
same time establish a dialectical relationship between philosophy and the empirically oriented 
sciences. My argument is that rational reconstruction represents a fruitful transformation of 
this program. It enables the critical theorist to work both normatively and descriptively at the 
same time while the reconstructed core concepts also makes possible a dialectical relationship 
between philosophy and the social sciences. The concept of communicative action is a critical 
normative concept describing constitutive ideals which at the same time can be used to 
normatively assess the quality of discourse. Furthermore, the concept is increasingly being 
employed by empirically oriented political scientists thus establishing a dialectical 
relationship between the philosopher and the social scientist. This interpretation suggests that 
the very fact that reconstructed concepts are being taken up and used as starting points in 
empirical theories is a kind of corroboration of the theory. 
In the fourth paper, Justification and application: the revival of the Rawls-Habermas 
debate, I discuss the challenge from Rawls’ second major work, Political Liberalism. I defend 
Habermas’ against Rawls’ claim that his theory is comprehensive and thus not able to give a 
good account of political legitimacy for modern societies characterized by the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. I also demonstrate that Habermas’ theory of political legitimacy has 
some crucial advantages as a critical theory which is not to be found in Rawls’ conception.  
 An implicit theme in the different articles which is made explicit in the introduction is 
the relationship between philosophy and empirical science. I argue that the research on 
Habermas has not managed to grasp what I refer to as the philosophy/science interplay due to 
its lack of focus on the methodological aspects of rational reconstruction. Thus, the proposal I 
defend is that reading Habermas through the lens of rational reconstruction provides an often 
missed opportunity to understand the complex relationship between philosophy and science in 
Habermas’ writings. This is important because of the promises it holds for the cooperation 
between philosophy and (social) science.           
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 1 
INTRODUCTION1 
 
The philosophy of Jürgen Habermas has been widely debated the last 50 years. In fact, his 
work has been so much discussed that it is no longer possible to have a comprehensive 
overview of the secondary literature. Embarking on the project of writing this PhD 
dissertation, it was therefore surprising to find that the method he has followed in his different 
research projects has not been subject to more debate.2 Habermas characterizes this method as 
rational reconstruction, and it is this method which is the object of this study.3 Throughout, I 
shall argue that Habermas’ methodical innovation represents an interesting but problematic 
way of confronting a series of basic questions pertaining both to epistemology and ethics as 
well as to political philosophy.  
 The method of rational reconstruction is designed for a systematic reconstruction of 
“the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects”, as well as the “collective knowledge of 
traditions”.4 This method is based on the assumption that there is normative content implicit 
in a set of social practices, and that collaboration between philosophy and what Habermas 
refers to as the reconstructive sciences can explicate this content. The explicated normative 
content provides a critical standard against which actual practices can be evaluated. 
According to Habermas, the normative content – which can be discovered through empirical 
reconstructions of a set of different practices – constitutes preconditions for these practices. 
However, in contrast to traditional transcendental philosophy after Kant, rational 
reconstruction is described as an empirical science which yields fallible knowledge.    
                                                 
1
 The Faculty of Humanities at the University of Bergen has recommended that “the PhD thesis can be a 
monograph or consist of 3-4 articles with an introduction which outlines the overall argument and sums up the 
essence of the articles. The introduction should have the same length as a scientific article within the relevant 
field of research”. These are recommendations I have tried to follow, although I must admit that the introduction 
has become a rather long article. See http://www.uib.no/hf/forskning/forskerutdanning-ved-det-humanistiske-
fakultet/forskerutdanningslopet/avhandlingen 
2
 However, it should be noted that in the last couple of years a growing interest in Habermas’ method can be 
found in works such as Iser 2008 and 2009, Gaus 2009 a and b, Hedrick 2010, Honneth 2009 and Celikates 
2009. Prior to this “second generation” of writings on rational reconstruction a number of earlier contributions 
should also be noted. The most important being McCarthy 1978, Alford 1985 and Baynes 1989. For a more 
comprehensive overview of the secondary literature see article 1 and 2.   
3
 Habermas describes the method in different ways, sometimes as a reconstructive procedure and sometimes as a 
methodological attitude. In line with the established literature on rational reconstruction I shall be speaking of 
the method of rational reconstruction (see McCarthy 1978:276 and Iser 2009:364). A method is a systematic 
procedure to obtain knowledge, and in the case of rational reconstruction it is a procedure for making implicit 
competencies and knowledge explicit. The term rational reconstruction was not coined by Habermas, it has been 
employed by Hempel and a number of analytic philosophers within the tradition of logical positivism as well as 
by Lakatos. For the former, rational reconstruction is “concerned exclusively with the logical and systematic 
aspects of sound scientific theorizing and the knowledge claims it yields” (Hempel: 1988:293), whereas for the 
latter, the research process is the object of rational reconstruction (1970). I shall not discuss any of these theories 
here as they clearly differ from Habermas’ understanding of rational reconstruction. 
4
 See Habermas 1979:9 for the first part of this definition, and Habermas 1987:399 for the latter.  
 2 
After introducing the concept of rational reconstruction in 1973, Habermas keeps 
coming back to this theme in a number of writings stretching from 1973 to 2011. Thus, the 
primary motive behind the different articles in this dissertation has been to clarify and discuss 
what the method of rational reconstruction is, bringing these different texts together in a 
systematic way. However, I have also attempted to develop the method of rational 
reconstruction in various directions, focusing both on empirical designs of research projects 
which start out from Habermas’ key concepts as well as discussing it against other 
(re)constructive projects (Rawls, Honneth).5 
There are two main reasons for this focus on rational reconstruction. First, Habermas 
is, in my opinion, able to provide important insights regarding both how to do philosophy and 
how empirical social sciences can enter into cooperation with philosophy. But in order to fully 
realize the potential of Habermas’ writings, it is necessary to further develop some of the 
themes Habermas himself has not treated in a satisfactory manner. In short, my main point is 
that Habermas obscures the status of rational reconstruction when stating that the hypotheses 
produced by rational reconstruction shall be tested indirectly by being used as “inputs in 
empirical theories”. The importance of this point suggests a thorough elaboration which 
Habermas has not been willing to give. Because of this, I shall argue, a specific interpretation 
of some aspects of Habermas’ writings on rational reconstruction is required.  
This particular interpretation of rational reconstruction yields a distinct understanding 
of what I refer to as the philosophy/science interplay, which in my opinion is crucial both for 
philosophy and for empirical social science. The philosopher must draw on the findings of 
empirical social science when working out its basic concepts, and these concepts must prove 
their validity through successful application in empirical research projects. I argue that 
Habermas, at least to a certain extent, has lived up to this challenge. But, and this is my 
second point, this dimension of Habermas’ thought is not captured in standard interpretations 
of Habermas, and the particular philosophy/science interplay is not sufficiently grasped in the 
literature on rational reconstruction.6 Thus, the proposal which I shall defend in this 
introduction is that reading Habermas through the lens of rational reconstruction provides an 
                                                 
5
 A more detailed description of the methodological aspects of the dissertation can be found in section B below.  
6
 In particular, as I shall argue in section D, two of the most important contributions to the literature on rational 
reconstruction, produced by Mattias Iser and Daniel Gaus have not captured what I refer to as the 
philosophy/science interplay. The result is an understanding of rational reconstruction which is not capable of 
bringing out its full potential.   
 3 
often missed opportunity to understand the relationship between philosophy and science in 
Habermas’ writings.7              
 In order to demonstrate this I shall start with a discussion of three representatives of 
what Habermas refers to as reconstructive sciences: Chomsky, Piaget and Kohlberg (A). This 
entry into the writings of Habermas allows me to focus on a crucial aspect of his thinking: the 
detranscendentalization of reason, meaning roughly that the knowledge achieved through 
rational reconstruction is “not necessary, but hypothetical, not a priori but empirical, not 
certain, but fallible” (Bohman and Rehg 2009). Rational reconstruction can be understood as 
the means to this end. Based on this outline, I shall subsequently present what I see as the 
crucial characteristics of rational reconstruction, and the division of labour it prescribes 
between philosophy and the empirical sciences (B). I then proceed with a presentation of the 
different results of the four articles (C). In the next section (D), I shall address some of the 
other approaches which have recently focused on rational reconstruction, and in the final 
section (E) I will present my main conclusion.  
 
(A) THE RECONSTRUCTIVE SCIENCES: CHOMSKY, PIAGET AND KOHLBERG8 
 
On Habermas’ account, the reconstructive sciences “take up the pretheorethical knowledge of 
competently judging, acting and speaking subjects, as well as the collective knowledge of 
traditions” (Habermas 1987:399). The relationship between philosophy and the reconstructive 
sciences is a difficult topic which I shall return to later,9 but Habermas suggests both a 
division of labour between these two approaches, and at the same time his conception of 
philosophy draws heavily on insights from theoreticians such as Chomsky, Piaget and 
Kohlberg. To understand this difficult interplay I shall start by introducing some key aspect of 
the work of these three. The reader should bear in mind that these theoreticians are examined 
here primarily to achieve a better understanding of Habermas’ theories. Therefore, this 
presentation will neither be complete nor exhaustive. It is rather an inquiry in the service of a 
                                                 
7
 This means that the introduction develops further some implicit themes which are introduced in the articles but 
which are not fully realized there.  
8
 It should be noted at the outset that the term “reconstructive sciences” as a description for Chomsky, Piaget and 
Kohlberg is Habermas’ term. A more traditional label which would probably be more in line with the self-
understanding of these three would be to say that they are cognitive scientists.  
9
 Habermas describes it as a “delicate relationship” (Habermas 1990 b: 34). 
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specific goal, and that goal is to achieve a better understanding of rational reconstruction as 
the methodical approach underpinning Habermas’ research-programs.10  
Habermas utilizes a central theme from each of the three thinkers he draws upon. 
Chomsky’s universal grammar aims to reconstruct linguistic competence, whereas Habermas 
transforms this idea in an attempt to reconstruct communicative competence. Piaget 
introduces a theory of a universal developmental logic regarding children’s cognitive 
development, elements of which Habermas claims can be transferred to collective learning 
processes. While Habermas employs the formal aspects of Piaget’s theory of cognitive 
development, the substantial content is primarily influenced by Kohlberg’s thoughts on the 
demarcated stages of moral consciousness.  
The reconstructive sciences provide Habermas with a model for his own research: they 
are all concerned with making an implicit universal competence explicit. They also focus on 
presuppositions, but the analysis of presuppositions is, as opposed to Kant, empirical, not 
transcendental. Chomsky is concerned with the presuppositions for grammatical competence, 
while Piaget focuses on presuppositions for formal-operational development. Kohlberg 
analyses the presuppositions for moral development. And, finally, they all understand their 
investigations as developing research programs which advance strong theoretical claims 
which must be corroborated through empirical research.    
 
Chomsky11 
 
Noam Chomsky’s (1928- ) Syntactic Structures from 1957 has transformed linguistics12 in 
several areas. His nativist hypothesis which forms the basis of generative grammar, is 
regarded today as an important alternative to the psychodynamic, the behaviorist and the 
social constructivist theories of language. Chomsky claims that children are programmed to 
learn language from birth, that linguistic development is as natural as physical development. 
The disposition to develop language is universal, directly correlated to structures in the brain. 
These structures contain rules and principles for how our language will be constructed. The 
underlying assumption is that the brain is a collection of modules, in which the various 
                                                 
10
 Because the focus in this section is to achieve a better understanding of Habermas’ method, I shall not discuss 
critically the way Habermas reads Chomsky, Piaget and Kohlberg.  
11
 My exposition of Chomsky relies primarily on Chomsky 1965 and 2002, but also on Habermas 1979 and 
Faarlund 2005. Chomsky’s research program has developed substantially since the early phase that I am 
considering. An excellent account of this development can be found in Chomsky 1986.  
12
 Chomsky maintains that generative grammar is a cognitive science, and therefore his research falls under the 
rubric of psychology (Chomsky 1986:5).  
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modules are specialized to handle different forms of information. One of these modules is a 
language module.  
 Chomsky employs first a decisive distinction between competence and performance. 
Competence concerns a language user’s unconscious knowledge of their own language, while 
performance encompasses the manifestation of this knowledge, which would be use of 
language in concrete situations (Chomsky1965:3-4). Chomsky also notes that competence 
involves implicit knowledge, and that it is not directly linked to the ability to make use of 
such knowledge. The reason for this is that language use (performance) cannot be an object 
for reconstruction in the same way as an idealized competence. Chomsky further limits the 
concept of competence solely to grammatical competence, it being generative grammar’s 
object of study.   
 Chomsky is preoccupied with how children can learn language as quickly as they do, 
and in relation to this, presents his universal grammar. He localizes universal grammar in the 
aforementioned structures of the brain and asserts that they form the starting point for a 
language user’s eventual fully developed linguistic competence. Chomsky conceives of 
universal grammar as the initial state children are born into, being prior to the learning of a 
first language. 
 This means that it is the capability for language which is the object of study. 
Generative grammar can therefore be defined as “a system of rules that in some explicit and 
well-defined way assigns structural descriptions to sentences” (Chomsky 1965:8). The task of 
this science is ultimately to make explicit our unconscious knowledge of our own language.13  
 One of Chomsky’s central hypotheses is that language learning in children proceeds 
through various states, and that these states are the same for all languages. There exists no 
marked variance between different language groups, even though there are pronounced 
individual differences within any given group.  
 The fundamental question that Chomsky claims competing theories of language 
cannot adequately provide an answer to is this: how can children learn a first language so well 
and so quickly when there is a disconnect between the input they receive and the competence 
they acquire? Language mastery is successful in all normal cases, while other cognitive 
activities, such as mathematics, exhibit very large variation in the eventual competence a child 
acquires. As mentioned, Chomsky regards humans as language using creatures born with a 
grammatical brain structure. The language specific grammars manifest their function when a 
                                                 
13
 As Chomsky notes, the term ““generative” means nothing more than “explicit”” (Chomsky 1986:5).   
 6 
child begins to be exposed to linguistic input in their first years of life. Put another way, there 
exists both a universal and a particular grammar: 
 
The grammar of a particular language, then, is to be supplemented by a universal 
grammar that accommodates the creative aspect of language use and express the deep-
seated regularities which, being universal, are omitted from the grammar itself 
(Chomsky 1965:6) 
 
The passage above is significant. Chomsky holds that the various directions in modern 
linguistics have set too much focus on particular grammar. Understanding how children learn 
language quickly and relatively independently of the provided input requires the postulation 
of a universal grammar. This, Chomsky says, makes it possible to explain how an open-ended 
(infinite) system can be learned, yet another example Chomsky employs to criticize traditional 
linguistics. The answer is that language is infinite, while grammar is finite. With the aid of a 
limited rule set, one can thereby generate an infinite number of sentences. It follows that there 
exists an enormous creative potential in the combinations of rules and words our language 
contains.  
 On one level, generative grammar has the existence of a universal grammar as a 
fundamental premise. In this sense it could be understood as a postulate. But Chomsky always 
insisted that there was more to it than that. The theory is based on observations and logical 
conclusions. Observations concern two factors: Children’s ability to learn language quickly 
and early in their development, as well as the fact that language exists in all the cultures and 
societies we know of. The logical conclusions involves the complexity of grammar and the 
fact that children master their language as early as they do, as well as the fact that children 
have the ability to produce an infinite number of utterances from a finite grammar (Farlund 
2005:138).  
 Still, the theory claims to produce hypotheses which must be subjected to empirical 
testing. Part of the theory’s attractiveness must then be understood on the basis of its ability to 
come up with new hypotheses which are in need of further corroboration. Farlund claims that 
there are primarily two ways the hypothesis of a universal grammar can be tested. First, by 
studying the grammar of a concrete language, and second, by bringing in data from new 
languages (Faarlund 2005:139-140).  The numerous empirical studies carried out to test the 
different hypotheses produced by Chomsky suggest that some of his hypotheses were too 
 7 
strong. Still, generative grammar is clearly among the most important paradigms within 
linguistic theory today.14         
 
Piaget15 
 
The Swiss biologist, psychologist and theoretician of science Jean Piaget (1896-1980) 
originated the concept of genetic epistemology, a theory of the origin and development of 
knowledge. Genetic epistemology represents one of the most important contributions within 
cognitive developmental psychology. Piaget drew upon his extensive knowledge in the 
natural sciences, such as biology and zoology, which together with a longstanding interest in 
epistemological questions shaped his writing. The theory is considered cognitive because it 
primarily focuses on the ability to interpret and evaluate situations, to thereby rationally come 
to a decision as to the best course of action. Piaget maintained that there exists universal ways 
in which to think and reason in problem solving, and that this reasoning process develops 
through qualitative stages. He arrived at this conclusion through a series of empirical studies 
of children’s intellectual development.  
 Piaget claimed that cognitive development occurs through four qualitatively different 
stages. These stages are identified as the sensorimotor stage, from 0 to 2 years of age; the 
preoperational stage, from roughly 2 to 7-8 years of age; the concrete operational stage, from 
7-8 to 11-12 years of age; and the formal operational stage, from 11-12 years of age and 
through an adult life. Thus, Piaget conceives of the learning process as decentration, where 
the child’s perspective becomes less egocentric and more decentrated as the child matures: 
“Cognitive egocentrism… stems from a lack of differentiation between one’s own point of 
view and the other possible ones” (Piaget quoted in Peterman 1997:6).   
 Piaget’s stage theory supports a theory of developmental logic. The thesis builds upon 
four assumptions. First, a child’s cognitive development must be said to contain clearly 
                                                 
14
 In article 1 (p 468), I outline the characteristic features of Habermas’ formal pragmatics. Here, Habermas takes 
Chomsky’s idea of a reconstruction of linguistic competence as a model for his own reconstruction of 
communicative competence. Habermas’ formal pragmatics (initially called universal pragmatics) aims to 
reconstruct, or to make explicit a universal communicative competence. This research program is clearly 
modelled on Chomsky’s thinking. “The assumption is that communicative competence has just as universal a 
core as linguistic competence” (Habermas 1979:26). However, Habermas sees the innateness thesis as to strong 
for a pragmatic theory of speech acts. Communicative competence is not innate, but acquired through 
socialization. Thus, it makes more sense for Habermas to regard this competence as a “result of a learning 
process that may – like cognitive development in the sense of Piaget’s cognitivist approach – follow a rationally 
reconstructible pattern (Habermas 1979:20).      
15
 My explanation of Piaget is primarily based on Piaget 1970 and 1972, but also Rørvik 1980 and Brainerd 
1978.  
 8 
defined phases of intellectual development. In other words, the process must be able to be 
described as a discontinuous process rather than a continuous one. A child’s development 
exhibits qualitatively different stages, not just a quantitative cognitive growth. Secondly, each 
individual must progress through the same stages in the same way. The formal operational 
stage is therefore not achievable without having first passed through the previous stages. 
Thirdly, the stages are hierarchically arranged. The level of the formal operational stage 
represents a higher stage of development due to the fact that it includes elements from the 
other three stages. Finally, each stage must constitute an integrated whole, a holistic element 
in Piaget’s thinking which I shall return to below. 
 The most important singular concept in Piaget’s theoretical framework is cognitive 
structure (see Piaget 1970). The concept refers to the form or pattern cognition exhibits within 
each of Piaget’s stages of mental development. His cognitive structures are abstract objects in 
the sense that they cannot be directly observed. It is not possible to measure a cognitive 
structure, despite Piaget’s perception of them as real. On the contrary, Piaget asserts that we 
can deduce cognitive structures’ real existence on the basis of what the cognitive content in 
the various stages have in common. Piaget’s argument is roughly the following: no one has 
ever observed, or directly measured the existence of an electron or a gene. Nonetheless, we 
know that they have a real existence, thus it is also possible to postulate cognitive structures 
(Brainerd 1978:18-19). These deep lying structures are localized in the manner in which 
infants, children and adults reason through and solve practical problems.  
 Cognitive structures are, according to Piaget, neither innate nor static.16 They evolve 
and change in the course of the developmental process. This process, which Piaget terms an 
equilibration process, is made up of four characteristics which are highly relevant to our 
discussion. In general, an individual finds oneself within one of the aforementioned stages, 
coinciding with the controlling cognitive structure for that level. These cognitive structures 
are only able to negotiate a limited set of challenges. The organism, which is Piaget’s 
biological form of expression, is then faced with a type of information the given cognitive 
structure is unable to successfully manage. Thus, the cognitive structure is unbalanced, 
requiring an adaptation which could negotiate the new, unmanageable information. The new 
structures which are formed in this process therefore appear more stable than those at the 
previous level. It follows that increasingly fewer situations are encountered which are capable 
                                                 
16
 Piaget specifically challenges Chomsky’s “innateness thesis” (see Piaget 1970:87) in a passage with the 
noteworthy title “Are linguistic structures social formations, innate or the result of equilibration?” 
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of stimulating an imbalance since the new cognitive structures contain a broader register 
regarding the negotiation of novel challenges.17 
Piaget also develops a theory of moral development. Here, Piaget is primarily 
concerned to show that there are two clearly defined ways of thinking in moral questions: 
First, one can act from nonsymetrical respect, in which one submits to the limits of 
authoritative prescriptions, be it regulative or personal (restrictive morality). Secondly, one 
can act from a position of mutual respect in which, through cooperation and agreement, one 
arrives at moral action (reciprocal morality) (Rørvik 1980:27). The fundamental hypothesis 
Piaget develops and claims to have confirmed through his empirical studies, is that there is a 
development in children leading from restrictive morality towards reciprocal morality. 
Piaget started out by observing how children where thinking and acting in play. This is 
where his theory took shape and his hypothesis started to emerge. In order to test them, Piaget 
told short stories to children, and afterwards interviewed them. One example of this procedure 
is sufficient here. It concerns children’s evaluation of consequence and intention (objective 
and subjective responsibility) in the context of harmful action. Piaget claims that children’s 
justifications for such actions are of central import. To what degree a child evaluates the 
consequences of a harmful action, or whether he is primarily focused on the intention behind 
the action, can provide pointed information about restrictive or reciprocal morality.  
 One story was about a person who did harm without understanding that it could have 
occurred (clumsy behavior). Another told of harm which came about due to a conscious act. 
Piaget’s interviews, which were directly tied to the stories, showed that appreciation of 
consequences sank with age, as the appreciation of intentions increased. After 10 years of age, 
there was seldom an answer that clearly showed solely an evaluation of consequence, in 
accordance with Piaget’s expectations (Rørvik 1980:23).   
Brainerd notes three important characteristics of this method. First, it finds itself 
positioned between psychology’s two standard methods: it is neither a pure experimental 
method (based on manipulation) nor a pure survey study (in which one only measures without 
manipulation). The degree of manipulation appears to increase with the age of the child. 
Secondly, there are uncommonly few subjects (children) in the studies, a point problematized 
                                                 
17
 In article 1, I demonstrate how Habermas’ analyses rationalization as a dialectical process of learning which 
adopts much of Piaget’s view as to how the transition between different stages occurs.  
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by Piaget’s critics. Thirdly, the procedure varies to a great degree from one subject to the 
next. In other words, a standard procedure is not adhered to (Brainerd 1978:39-41).18  
 
Kohlberg19 
 
Habermas has primarily drawn upon Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1927-87) work as it pertains to 
moral development. Kohlberg, who studied under Piaget, further refined much of Piaget’s 
thinking in moral developmental psychology. On the basis of empirical investigations which 
follow more or less the same formula as Piaget’s work, Kohlberg presents three primary 
levels for moral development. Each of these levels has two secondary levels such that, 
together, there is a stage theory containing six different stages. These developmental stages 
are universal, and should be traceable across cultural contexts. They are also, as in Piaget’s 
research, hierarchically ordered and irreversible in the direction of progress. Also for 
Kohlberg, moral development is characterized by the transition from the concrete to the 
abstract, from the particular to the universal and from the egocentric to that which is marked 
by mutuality and respect. 
 During the pre-conventional, or pre-moral level, a child’s action is not distinguished 
by norms or rules. According to the theory, a child shows no concern for others, nor shows 
any sign of acting from a feeling of duty. When a child evaluates their actions, it is done from 
an orientation towards punishment and obedience. Right action means, in short, obedience to 
authority in order to minimize punishment and maximize reward.  
 The somewhat more developed, or mature, form for action within the pre-conventional 
level is termed a naïve instrumental hedonism. The correct moral act is here defined as that 
form of action which immediately satisfies one’s own interests, or in following rules which 
accomplish the same satisfaction of self-interest. At this level, elements of mutuality and 
                                                 
18
 In article 1 (p. 474), I outline Habermas’ theory of social evolution. The theory of stages, the theory of 
cognitive structure, and the concept of decentration is of particular importance to Habermas. It is not the content 
of the stage theory which is of importance to Habermas, but its formal characteristics. Thus where Piaget’s 
theory supports a developmental logic for individual development (ontogenesis), Habermas argues for a similar 
developmental logic in social evolution (phylogenesis). Furthermore, Habermas models his theory of social 
development on Piaget’s equilibration process describing a dialectic process between the cognitive-technological 
and the moral-practical sphere. Still, Habermas criticises the way Piaget uses the concept of equilibration. 
Following Piaget too closely on this point would imply the danger of committing the naturalistic fallacy. “Every 
attempt to view the superiority of higher-level achievements, which are measured in terms of the validity of 
problem-solving attempts, in strictly functional terms places the specific achievement of cognitivist 
developmental theory in jeopardy. If what is true or morally right could be analyzed in terms of what is 
necessary for the maintenance of system boundaries, we would not need rational reconstruction” (Habermas 
1990 b:34-35). Habermas thinks that Kohlberg’s theory is corrected for these flaws.      
19
 My discussion of Kohlberg is based primarily on Kohlberg 1981, but also on Habermas 1979 and Rørvik 
1980. 
 11 
respect can be distinguished, but this is interpreted only as an expression of the child giving 
something in order to receive in return. Or as Habermas phrases it: reciprocity is an element 
of “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours, not of loyalty, gratitude or justice” (Habermas 
1979:79).  
 At the conventional level there is an understanding that honoring the family’s, group’s 
or nation’s expectations is valuable in itself, not just something done out of self-interest. Right 
action is thus defined by conformity to social roles and norms. Kohlberg operates with five 
characteristics at the conventional level. The first is marked by moral stereotypy, that a child 
refers to particular people in their explanations of right and wrong. The second characteristic 
is intentionality, or that an act is evaluated from the intentions of the actor (cf. Piaget above). 
The third is characterized by a positive, active and empathetic description of that which is 
morally good. The fourth is characterized by sensitivity, or that a person is receptive to 
recognition and criticism. The fifth characteristic is identification with a dominant person or 
the goals they may have (Rørvik 1980:99-100 and Kohlberg 1963:26).  
 The mature form of the conventional orientation replaces the “good girl”, one who 
primarily does that which adults wish from within a law and order orientation. The child 
orients themselves over time towards the desire to maintain the social order, achievable by 
following socially given norms and rules.  
 At the post-conventional level the orientation changes from forms of external authority 
such as parents or the social order, to an internal autonomous orientation where the individual 
follows its own conscience. The individual orients itself in accordance with contracts and 
agreements where laws and rules receive a fixed meaning. So far, this is very similar to the 
conventional stage. There is, however, an important difference. Individuals who find 
themselves at this stage take a critical stance towards the actual social norms. They think 
reflexively, i.e., that they evaluate what their plan of action should be in relation to the 
concrete choices available. Principle is paramount, regardless of what others may think. This 
stage differentiates itself further from stages 3 and 4 by being oriented towards democratic 
group decisions rather than being oriented towards concrete persons. Individuals are also 
more engaged, and show a greater degree of duty since they accept and respect the laws and 
rules they are confronted with. The post-conventional level is also divided into two stages. 
The fifth stage thus represents a contractual or legal orientation, while the sixth stage is 
defined by a universal ethical principle orientation (Rørvik 1980:101). 
 At the pinnacle, the sixth stage distinguishes between legal rights and duties and moral 
rights and duties, in which the latter are said to rank higher. In this case, actions are not 
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sufficiently justified merely through legal justification. Individuals orient themselves 
according to their own conscience, and from abstract (formal) moral principles such as the 
categorical imperative or the golden rule (Rørvik 1980:101 and Kohlberg 1963:28). Other’s 
reactions to a given act are given much less credence. The decisive factor is one’s own 
conscience which is guided by some form of universalization principle. Moral norms are 
tested at this level according to how well they can meet the demands of universal validity. 
Right action is therefore that action we can postulate all humanity is capable of accepting. 
Individuals at this level are concerned with human equality, and universal human rights are 
prominent.20 
Kohlberg’s famous Heinz dilemma is a good illustration of the way he works. 
Conducting research on the justification respondents would give to different moral dilemmas, 
Kohlberg presented the following story and questions:  
 
In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. 
There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium 
for which the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. The 
sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he 
could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife 
was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, 
“No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it.” So Heinz got 
desperate and broke in to the man’s store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the 
husband have done that? Why? (Kohlberg 1981:12 quoted in Habermas 1990:39-40)  
 
From the theorist’s perspective, the crucial point is not what the respondents thinks that Heinz 
should do, but how they justify their recommendations. The answers given enabled Kohlberg 
to identify justifications belonging to each of the six stages mentioned above. But the 
questions posed would also enable the respondents to reflexively engage their own pre-
theoretically grounded moral judgement.21 
                                                 
20
 In article 1 (p 478), I demonstrate how Habermas adopts the different stages introduced by Kohlberg in 
phylogenesis. And, as we shall see in the next section, Kohlberg is also relevant in a discussion of the status of 
rational reconstruction.  
21
 I can not go into in detail the massive critique that has been levelled against both Piaget and Kohlberg here. 
But I would like to mention the different types of critique which are normally directed against their research: 1) it 
is a fundamental problem that children are identified as egoists from birth, thereafter to be socialized into moral 
relations, thus becoming moral creatures. Critics point out that psychological studies show that children very 
early on can show trust, comfort and be generous with others; 2) Piaget and Kohlberg focus primarily on 
cognitive ability in children’s development. Emotions are therefore not given sufficient attention; 3) Carol 
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The model provided by the reconstructive sciences can perhaps best be summed up 
using the term research program. Chomsky provides a paradigmatic example: He considers 
his own work and the many empirical projects carried out within the same tradition as open 
ended, ongoing research programs always receptive to revision and the rethinking of their 
basic concepts. Thus, instead of regarding the difference in opinion, as well as the many 
revisions that have been undertaken within generative grammar as a serious problem, they are 
considered as evidence that the discipline is alive. Its strength consists of its ability to 
“provide answers to a range of empirical questions and opens up a variety of new ones to 
inquiry while suggesting a rethinking of others” (Chomsky 1986:5). This conception of an 
open ended research program, which shall generate hypotheses which are to be tested 
empirically, is familiar in science, but perhaps not as familiar as a philosophical approach. In 
the next section I will discuss how Habermas transforms this ideal into a philosophical 
research program.   
For Habermas, it is also of vital importance that Piaget and Kohlberg are committed 
neither to the relativistic nor the foundational understanding of competence. With the help of 
a stage theory, being hierarchically structured such that one at a higher level can be said to 
have achieved a better insight than that of the previous level, one can avoid the trap of 
relativism, while at the same time not being bound to any given form of foundationalism. This 
is a crucial aspect of Habermas’ thinking. In fact, if my interpretation is correct, he considers 
Piaget’s contribution to be able to transform, in a postmetaphysical fashion, some of the 
crucial aspects of both transcendental philosophy from Kant, and dialectical philosophy from 
Hegel:  
The genetic structuralism of Jean Piaget provides an instructive model… 
instructive for all philosophers I think, but particularly to those who want to 
remain philosophers. Piaget conceives “reflective abstraction” as that learning 
mechanism which explains the transition between cognitive stages in 
ontogenetic development. The end point of this development is a decentered 
understanding of the world. Reflective abstraction is similar to transcendental 
reflection in that it brings out the formal elements hidden in the cognitive 
content, identifies them as the schemata that underlie the knowing subject’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
Gilligan has criticised Kohlberg for underplaying the care perspective in moral development, using that to argue 
that male and female reasoning differ substantially; 4) Piaget and Kohlberg’s theories have both been criticized 
for ethnocentrism. There are obvious similarities between the higher levels in their stage theories and the type of 
thinking that characterizes modern western societies; 5) Their research has been criticised for being theoretically 
strong but empirically weak. For these lines of criticism see Santrock 1997 as well as Henriksen and Vetlesen 
2000.     
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action, differentiates them, and reconstructs them at the following higher stage 
of reflection. Seen from a different perspective, the same learning mechanism 
has a function similar to Hegel’s power of negation, which dialectically 
supersedes self-contradictory forms of consciousness (Habermas 1990 a:8)22     
 
Thus, the empirically grounded claims which result from the research of Chomsky, Piaget and 
Kohlberg provide a model on which Habermas can achieve justifications which resemble 
those of the great German master thinkers. The foundationalism in Kant and the absolutism of 
Hegel is avoided through empirical reconstructions of competencies and learning processes. 
The model Chomsky provides allows Habermas an empirical reconstruction of the 
presuppositions for communication oriented towards agreement (Einverständnis). The claim 
Habermas gains from this analysis is that there is a normative pull operating in language. 
Thus it gives him a foundation, even though it is not a foundation rooted in transcendental 
deduction of the Kantian style. Instead, Habermas’ reconstructions are transcendental in a 
weak sense (Habermas 1979:22).23  
The analysis would however not be complete if it was not given a historical twist. 
Based on the idea that there is a complementary relationship between communicative action 
and the lifeworld, where the lifeworld structure and limits the semantic horizon of 
communicative action (Owen 1998:2), it is necessary for Habermas to demonstrate how the 
intersubjective structures which constitute different lifeworlds develop. This developmental 
perspective, which Habermas to a large extent models on Piaget and Kohlberg, provides a 
model for Habermas’ Hegelian motives, allowing him to demonstrate how action-
coordination through language will always be historically situated.  
 At this point we are in a better position to understand what I have referred to as the 
philosophy/science interplay in Habermas’ writings. But before I can spell out the details, I 
will present the key characteristics of the object of this study, the method of rational 
reconstruction.   
       
(B) HABERMAS’ METHOD: RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION24 
                                                 
22
 I have altered the translation on two points. First, the emphasis on the formal and content is in the original 
German text, but not in the translation. Second, and more importantly, the English translation has “differentiates 
them, and reconstructs them at the next highest stage of reflection”, whereas the German original has 
“differenziert und auf der nächst höheren Reflexionsstufe rekonstruirt”.   
23
 This argument is spelled out in article 1.  
24
 Because paper nr 1 and 2 both present the basic principles of rational reconstruction in an almost identical 
way, the presentation and discussion carried out in this introduction is an attempt to present the core of 
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Habermas uses the term reconstruction in at least two different, but related ways. First, it is 
employed as a reading strategy, as a way to read classics and other important figures who 
have produced important texts relevant for his own research programs. Habermas’ reading of 
Chomsky, Piaget and Kohlberg are examples in point here. In this respect, Habermas 
reconstructs by taking different theoretical positions apart and then bringing them back 
together after correcting their insights from fundamental flaws.25 Habermas refers to this 
approach as a “history of theory with a systemic intent” (Habermas 1984:140). To Habermas 
this strategy is as important for scientific research as other approaches. It demonstrates the 
importance of the methodological approaches developed in the humanities, and the different 
readings are in need of validation in order to establish their authority.    
Now, Habermas characterizes this reading strategy as the “normal way of dealing with 
a theory that needs revision” (Habermas 1979:95). In my opinion this is a bit too modest. That 
is because there is also a particular twist to the readings that Habermas presents which 
consists in the search for implicit themes or thoughts which are later abandoned. Recently 
Deranty has given an interesting description of Honneth’s reading strategy which is also valid 
for the way Habermas reads the classics. Deranty argues that Honneth’s exegetical 
reconstructions are based on pinpointing a “fork in the conceptual road”. It consists in finding 
in a certain text “highly evocative, programmatic indications not fully realised or later 
abandoned” (Deranty 2009:3).26  
An example of Habermas’ reading which utilizes the same reading strategy is found in 
the way Habermas reads Weber in the Theory of Communicative Action. Here Habermas 
draws a distinction between an official and an unofficial version of Weber’s theory of action, 
claiming that the unofficial version could have been developed into a theory of action which 
could distinguish between communicative and instrumental/strategic action (Habermas 
1984:279-286). This unofficial version of Weber’s theory of action is, according to Habermas, 
implicit in Weber’s writings, but because it remains implicit, it is in need of further 
clarification.27  
                                                                                                                                                        
Habermas’ method in a somewhat different vocabulary and to a certain degree focusing on different texts. 
Habermas has increasingly dropped the prefix rational, and has in his later writings been referring to 
reconstruction (See Habermas 2011:291).  
25
 In Habermas own formulation: “In the present connection reconstruction signifies taking a theory apart and 
putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself” (Habermas 
1979:95).   
26
 See also my review of Deranty’s book in Pedersen 2010.  
27
 Another important example can be found in Habermas’ reconstruction of Hegel, where Habermas claims that 
Hegel in the Jena period introduced the possibility to carry through an intersubjectivistic turn, overcoming the 
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I have followed a similar reading strategy. I claim that it is necessary with a 
reconstruction of Habermas in order to achieve the goals he set for himself. At different 
moments, Habermas was explicitly concerned with the method of rational reconstruction, and 
in explaining its status. However, as his work developed, he did not fully realize the theory’s 
potential, and at some points seems to work on different premises.28 Thus, in order to fully 
realize the theories potential, it has been necessary to first systematically reconstruct the 
method of rational reconstruction due to the fact that it, in Habermas’ texts, has been 
developed somewhat unsystematically. And second, the status of the theory was in need of an 
explication due to the fact that Habermas himself treated this topic, but later did not follow 
up, and sometimes presented his theories as if he had “gambled away” his original insights.     
In addition to reconstruction as a reading strategy, Habermas is also using the term 
reconstructive to “describe theories that seek to explain the implicitly assumed normative 
contents of empirically established practices” (Habermas 2011:291).29 The term rational 
reconstruction is first employed by Habermas in 1973. Prior to that, in early works such as 
The Structural transformation of the Public Sphere, originally published in 1962, Habermas 
located the idea of rational discussion in the bourgeois public sphere. The idea of the public as 
an arena where the force of the better argument could reign was analysed as ideology, but also 
as something more than this. However, the conclusion drawn was that the ideals embedded in 
the public sphere could not be realised. On Habermas own account it became necessary to 
locate the ideals of the free and uncoerced conversation deeper.30 Thus, in Knowledge and 
Human Interests, originally published in 1968, Habermas attempts to ground this ideal 
                                                                                                                                                        
transcendental mentalism of Kant, but later “gambled away what from hindsight at least appear to be his original 
gains” (Habermas 2003:176).  
28
 An example might be Bernhard Peters’ criticism of Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms, where Peters claims 
that it is not always clear whether Habermas’ theory is rational reconstruction or normative theory in a more 
traditional sense (Peters 1994:118-119). This argument is presented in article 2 page 394. Recently, Habermas 
has clarified the status of reconstructive theory of the constitutional state in a way that looks like an answer to 
Peters: “The system of basic rights at which one arrives at the highest level of abstraction is virtually 
indistinguishable in form from normative political theory” (Habermas 2011:291 note 16).   
29
 In his later writings Habermas has tended to drop the prefix rational and speak of reconstructive theories. The 
term rational signals that focus is on the rational aspects inherent in a given practice. For example, Habermas 
understands the raising and the defending of claims as a rational enterprise, and it is this rational aspect of 
language use he is interested in as a reconstructive theorist. But that does not mean that he does not recognize 
that the non-rational aspects of language use such as rhetorical manipulation will be present as well (See Ingram 
2010:76).     
30
 Habermas writes: “I have therefore proposed to locate the normative foundation for a critical theory of society 
deeper. The theory of communicative action shall reveal the potential for reason located in everyday 
communicative practice. With this move it opens up for a reconstructive social science identifying the broad 
spectre of societal processes of rationalization, and even trace them back beyond the threshold of modern 
society. Then it is no longer necessary to limit the search for a normative potentials to the structure of a public 
limited to a specific epoch” (Habermas 1999:96, my translation; German original text: Vorwort zur Neuaflage In 
Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit, 1990).     
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anthropologically. But this project turned out to be unable to account for the intersubjective 
dimension inherent in speech. Thus, Habermas had by 1973, upon writing the postscript to the 
new edition of Knowledge and Human interests (Habermas 1973), come to the conclusion 
that it was necessary to start with a rational reconstruction of inherent normativety inherent in 
a set of different practices.31 
The method of rational reconstruction is foundational for four of Habermas’ research 
programs,32 the research programs which constitute the core of Habermas’ writings: in formal 
pragmatics he reconstructs conditions of possibilities for communication aimed at consensus, 
in the theory of social evolution he reconstructs the patterns of development structures of 
consciousness may follow, given that they develop, in discourse ethics he identifies the 
conditions of possibilities for regulating human action through norms, and in his theory of 
deliberative democracy he identifies conditions of possibilities for coordinating modern, 
pluralistic societies through positive law.33    
In his reconstructive enterprise, Habermas is concerned with various kinds of 
competencies as well as the collective knowledge of traditions. In the first instance, rational 
reconstruction aims at uncovering intuitive competences carried by speaking, and acting 
subjects. Habermas describes these competencies as a pre-theoretical know how, making it 
the job of philosophy and the reconstructive sciences to reconstruct, and thus make explicit 
the underlying rules which are presuppositions for such competencies: 
 
Starting primarily from the intuitive knowledge of competent subjects – 
competent in terms of judgment, action and language – and secondarily from 
systematic knowledge handed down by culture, the reconstructive sciences 
explain the presumably universal basis of rational experience and judgment, as 
well as of action and linguistic communication. (Habermas 1990 a:15-16)   
 
                                                 
31
 I can not give a full account of the development of Habermas’ work here. Excellent introductions to the 
transition in Habermas’ work from the structural transformation of the public sphere, and up until his 
introduction of rational reconstruction can be found in Habermas (1999), in Bohman and Rehg (2009) and in Iser 
(2008 and 2009).  
32
 As argued above, Habermas conceives of his different interests as research programs in the same sense as 
Chomsky: They are open-ended and tentative, and their basic concepts must be revised through the incorporation 
of valid criticism and on the basis of new empirical evidence. Thus Habermas distances himself from the 
foundationalism of Kant and the absolutism of Hegel by understanding his own research as modelled on the 
empirical sciences.  
33
 The articles in this dissertation introduce how rational reconstruction is foundational for formal pragmatics, the 
theory of social evolution and the theory of deliberative democracy. A discussion of discourse ethics can be 
found in Pedersen 2011 a.   
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Thus, rational reconstruction proceeds on the assumption of a normative content located in the 
deep-structure of different kinds of practices. This normative content is to be found in 
different competencies. These competencies can be located at a general level involving 
cognitive and linguistic practices, or at a more institutionalized level focusing for example on 
presuppositions for coordinating human interactions through the medium of law. At the 
general level Habermas is, for instance, reconstructing competencies subjects must have as 
language users, whereas on the institutionalized level Habermas is reconstructing 
competencies subjects must have as participants in democratic practices. In the first instance 
the reconstruction operates through conceptual analysis, whereas in the latter, the 
reconstruction comes closer to empirical research (Habermas 2005:385).   
 Now, what kind of method would be suitable for bringing out such competencies? In 
answering this question, Habermas attempts to demonstrate the difference between rational 
reconstruction and traditional hermeneutic interpretation. The relevant research must proceed 
on the assumption that its object is symbolically structured, thus requiring a performative 
attitude from the perspective of the participant. This assumption is shared with, and derived 
from insight developed in hermeneutics. But rational reconstruction does not search for 
meaning in a particular text or an utterance, neither does it analyse particular institutions or 
instances. Instead it focuses on underlying rules which the relevant subjects are not 
reflexively aware of but still have an intuitive ability to master. These rules yield a normative 
standard making it possible to criticize judgements, actions or utterances (Habermas 2009:24-
25).  
 The underlying assumption here is that there is a difference between a subject’s ability 
to master a certain competence and the explicit knowledge of the rules making the same 
competence possible.34 Take the competence of forming a grammatically correct sentence as 
an example: if a person makes the utterance “Saw you the black cat?”, we would typically 
reply stating that a correct thing to say would be “ Did you see the black cat?”. Thus, we have 
                                                 
34
 Anne Granberg has made me aware of the Heideggerian element in Habermas’ thinking on this issue. She 
writes: “In his phenomenological analyses, Heidegger seeks to highlight the necessary preconditions for the 
understanding inherent in goal-directed action like tool use, and to make explicit the tacit insights we “always 
already” have in our competence in handling implements. In a not dissimilar manner, universal pragmatics 
operates by making explicit – through a reconstruction – something we “always already” “know”(in the sense of 
being competent at) as communicative agents, and Habermas’ universal pragmatics can thus be seen as an 
analysis of the “how” of communication” (Granberg 2004:3). For a discussion of Heideggers influence on the 
young Habermas see Matustik 2001:12-17. Habermas, who described himself as a “thoroughgoing Heideggerian 
for three or four years”, lost his faith in his old philosophical hero on the 25th of July 1953 upon reading 
Heideggers new uncommented republication of his Introduction to metaphysics: “I was, as a student, at that time 
so impressed with Being and Time that reading these lectures, fascist down to their stylistic details, actually 
shocked me” (Habermas quoted in Matustik 2001:13).      
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an example of criticism based on the correct understanding of grammar. According to 
Habermas a number of different practices have a set of underlying rules which the 
philosopher must bring out and can use as point of departure for critique. 
 Another example would be the way Habermas conceives of rules and structures 
governing the practice of democracy. According to Habermas democracy presupposes a 
system of rights which can be reconstructed and employed as a standard and point of 
departure for criticism. Such criticism would for example be directed at governments not able 
to institutionalize rights which fulfil the explicated standards.35  
 So far, our focus has been directed towards individual competencies. The method of 
rational reconstruction, which focuses on the explication of intuitive knowledge is, however, 
not limited to the reconstruction of individual competencies, but can also reconstruct “the 
collective knowledge of traditions (Habermas 1987:399). In those cases, the object of study 
for the reconstructive researcher is collective learning processes where the ambition is to 
reconstruct “the emergence and the internal history of those modern complexes of knowledge 
that have been differentiated out, each under a single aspect of validity – truth, normative 
rightness or authenticity” (Habermas 1987:398, Baynes 1989:138).  
Thus, Habermas distinguishes between synchronical and diachronical reconstructions 
where the former deal with individual competencies, and the latter with the collective 
knowledge of traditions.36 When it comes to the latter, Habermas is concerned with learning 
processes, and with a reconstruction of the pattern such learning processes might take. 
Habermas first recognizes that in a strict sense, it is only individuals that can learn. But he 
subsequently demonstrates that social systems or intersubjective structures can develop by 
drawing on the learning capacities of individuals. And individuals can attain their 
competencies, not in complete isolation, but by growing into the established intersubjective 
structures (Habermas 1979:154). In this sense, it becomes possible to comprehend the 
dialectical interplay between the individual and the collective domain. Thus, we are dealing 
with different objects of reconstruction, but these different objects cannot be understood 
independently. This dialectic thus makes the diachronical reconstruction necessary because it 
demonstrates how individual competencies discovered through synchronical reconstruction 
                                                 
35
 For the detailed argument see article 4.  
36
 There are two versions of diachrone reconstruction: Ontogenesis and phylogenesis. But Habermas’ diachrone 
reconstruction is focused on phylogenesis.  
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can be allowed to develop according to the existing level of development in the collective 
domain.37     
Thus, the implicit or pre-theoretical knowledge possessed by competent subjects as 
well as the collective knowledge of traditions, must be brought out by the researcher to 
become available for the subjects themselves. This must be done using a number of different 
procedures. One example is what Habermas refers to as the maeutic method of interrogation:  
 
the implicit knowledge has to be brought to consciousness through the choice 
of suitable examples and counterexamples through contrast and similarity 
relations, through translation, paraphrase and so on – that is through a well 
sought out maeutic method of interrogation. (Habermas 1979:19)  
 
With a maeutic method of interrogation, Habermas is referring to a Socratic way of 
conducting conversation. The point is to try to become aware of what has until now only been 
implicitly presupposed. By asking questions from carefully chosen examples it becomes 
possible for the subject to realize their implicit knowledge or competence. Habermas’ 
favourite example is, of course, to use questions to force subjects to realize that they are 
committing performative self-contradictions, thus realizing what they must always already 
presuppose.38  
 The results of the reconstructive endeavour are general theories regarding human 
competencies (Habermas 1983:260). But the strong claims the reconstruction raises are not 
apriori claims such as given by traditional transcendental analysis in the tradition from Kant, 
but instead fallible hypotheses which are open to confirmation and falsification. Thus, 
philosophy must renounce the claim of any special access to reality, and instead take on board 
the self-understanding of the fallibilistic sciences (Habermas 1992:38). Therefore, rational 
reconstruction is not a distinct philosophical method which claims to have its own access to 
truth or a distinct object domain. This deflated understanding of philosophy is modest 
compared to Kant and the German idealists, but ambitious compared to Rorty and the 
postmodernists: 
 
                                                 
37
 Admittedly, the relationship between the synchronical and diachronical reconstructions undertaken by 
Habermas was unclear to me in article 1. It is a complex and difficult topic that I hope the reflections here have 
clarified, at least to some extent.  
38
 The maeutic method of interrogation is one example of a reconstructive enterprise, and should not be 
understood as reconstruction as such.  
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Once it has renounced its claim to be a first science or an encyclopedia, 
philosophy can maintain its status within the scientific system neither by 
assimilating itself to particular exemplary sciences nor by exclusively 
distancing itself from science in general. Philosophy has to implicate itself in 
the fallibilistic self-understanding and procedural rationality of the empirical 
sciences; it may not lay claim to a privileged access to truth, or to a method, an 
object realm, or even just a style of intuition that is specifically its own. Only 
thus can philosophy contribute its best to a nonexclusive division of labour, 
namely its persistence tenacity in posing questions universalistically, and its 
procedure of rationally reconstructing the intuitive pretheoretical knowledge of 
competently speaking, acting and judging subjects – yet in such a way that 
platonic anamnesis sheds its nondiscursive character. This dowry recommends 
philosophy as an indispensable partner in the collaboration of those who are 
concerned with a theory of rationality. (Habermas 1992:38) 
 
Furthermore, Habermas regards the rules and structures uncovered through rational 
reconstruction as invariant or universal presuppositions for the practice analysed. It “advances 
universalistic and thus very strong theses, but the status it claims for those theses are 
relatively weak” (Habermas 1990 c:116). Thus, it is not a matter of reconstructing 
competencies carried by a particular group, but instead, rational reconstruction aims to 
uncover necessary competencies for the species. According to Habermas, the claims arrived at 
through rational reconstruction describe a normative content embedded in given practices 
which overshoots the boundary of the particular practice analysed, enabling a context-
transcending normativity. (Olson 2003:276). Thus one can appreciate Habermas’ claim that 
rational reconstructions are not designed to produce a foundation for a normative theory in 
traditional sense:  
 
In contrast to my famous colleagues – like Rawls or Nozick – I have never had 
the ambition to come up with a normative political theory. Even though that 
makes good sense, I do not construct basic norms for a well ordered society on 
the drawing board. I am much more concerned with the reconstruction of the 
factual based on the premise that socialized individuals involved in the 
everyday practice of communication cannot avoid also to orient their 
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interaction in a consensual way. (Habermas quoted in Gaus 2009:14, my 
translation)39 
 
Thus, instead of accepting that a social theory should be either normative or descriptive, 
Habermas’ rational reconstructions aim to be both, at the same time. It is describing rules and 
structures operative in a social practice thus making possible a critique of deviant cases not 
following the standard of the rules and practices reconstructed.40 However, this enterprise is 
not directly prescriptive, as Habermas points out in Between Facts and Norms: practical 
reason “does not give a direct blueprint for a normative theory of law and morality” 
(Habermas 1996:5). It does not offer a concrete vision of the good life, and it does not 
prescribe directly any guidance for action.  
Instead rational reconstruction focuses on the formal and procedural aspects of the 
practices analysed. Thus, in formal pragmatics, Habermas is focusing on formal, as opposed 
to substantial conditions for reaching understanding. And in the theory of deliberative 
democracy, Habermas maintains that the theorist can specify the formal conditions required 
for undistorted communication between equals, but leaves it to the participants to decide what 
substantive norms should be drawn upon and how to act. Rational reconstruction could thus 
be made to fit with one of Habermas’ main ambitions; to present a less concrete alternative to 
the reigning paradigms within ethics and law. In these cases, Habermas distances himself 
from all concrete attempts to present a theory of the good life, focusing instead on the 
procedural aspects of undistorted intersubjectivity.41 Importantly, as Specter has recently 
demonstrated, “Habermas’ goal was to preserve the spirit of the utopia of a workers society, 
but to transpose its core values – freedom, equality, and solidarity – into a new, less 
concretely pictured framework” (Specter 2010:180). To this end, the method of rational 
reconstruction was ideally suited with its focus on the formal rationality operating within 
different practices.  
Thus, the normative content which is to be reconstructed is formal in kind, and not 
directly prescriptive. Still, as I shall argue in section D, this does not mean that the 
                                                 
39
 This quote is both a good illustration of the intentions behind Habermas’ rational reconstruction, and, at the 
same time an illustration of how Habermas misunderstands Rawls. As I demonstrate in the fourth paper, Rawls is 
also concerned to explicate latent ideals in modern constitutional democracies. The description of Rawls as a 
traditional normative theorist who constructs his theory of a well-ordered society without regard to reality is 
therefore misleading.    
40
 In section D, I shall elaborate on this point by arguing against Daniel Gaus’ reading which suggests that 
Habermas’ theory is not a critical theory.  
41
 I cannot discuss here whether undistorted intersubjectivity represents a theory of the good life. Habermas takes 
up this objection towards the end of Between Facts and Norms, p 445-446.  
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reconstruction should be considered strictly explanatory, as it provides a critical standard 
against which actual practices can be evaluated.      
By now we should have an idea of the characteristic features of Habermas’ method. 
Still, some pressing issues need to be addressed regarding the status of the method as it is 
situated between transcendental analysis and empirical research. In short, the question is this: 
if reconstructive sciences are empirical sciences, we need an answer to how the hypotheses 
put forward by rational reconstruction can be subjected to tests. Habermas’ answer has two 
steps. First, he claims that because rational reconstruction constitutes an alternative paradigm 
to the scientistic understanding of science, the testing of the theory cannot be modelled on the 
testing procedures used in these sciences. Second, Habermas claims that the hypotheses put 
forward by rational reconstruction should instead be “tested indirectly by employing them as 
input in empirical theories” (Habermas 1983:261).  
As argued above, I think Habermas could have been clearer in his own discussions on 
this particularly important topic. But I also think that an answer or a suggestion to this 
difficulty can be found in Habermas’ writings. What Habermas has in mind is probably that if 
the reconstructed concepts, such as the concepts of communicative action, can be taken up 
and used as a point of departure for empirical research, and yield fruitful results, that in itself 
is a corroboration of the reconstructed hypothesis. This would, in my opinion, amount to an 
indirect testing of the results of rational reconstruction.42  
There is at least some support for this interpretation in Habermas’ texts. In discussing 
the delicate relationship between rational reconstruction and empirical analysis, Habermas 
discusses the work of Kohlberg. Here, Habermas claims that: 
  
the validity of the normative theory is cast into doubt if the philosophical 
reconstructions prove to be unusable in the context of application within the 
empirical theory…If it cannot be done without violence and distortion, this 
very failure of hermeneutic application is an indication that the dimensions 
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 The detailed argument is spelled out in article 3. In that article I argue that a number of empirical research 
projects have been established to assess the quality of deliberation, taking the theory of communicative action as 
its point of departure. In particular, I refer to a double number of Acta Politica with the title Empirical 
Approaches to Deliberative Democracy. However, there are also a number of different approaches which 
suggests that we are dealing with a distinct, but immature research program within political science. As one 
researcher noted, “empirical research is booming at present”. The Discourse Quality Index (DQI) developed at 
the Bern Interdisciplinary Center for Deliberative Studies is perhaps the most well-known instrument to measure 
the quality of deliberation (Steenbergen et al 2003). Another important contribution within this field of research 
is the deliberative polls developed by James Fishkin at the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford (See 
Fishkin 2009). The best comprehensive account of the development within empirical approaches to deliberative 
democracy is given by Bächtiger et al. (2010).   
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postulated are being externally imposed and are not the result of a 
reconstruction from within. (Habermas 1990 b:39-40)  
 
In my opinion these passages support the interpretation I have given above, and presented in 
detail in article 3. However, the passages are extremely dense and difficult to interpret, 
something which underpins my conclusion that these themes are not fully explicated in 
Habermas’ own texts.43 For example, Habermas is not giving a detailed answer when it comes 
to when the indirect testing can be considered successful. Now, there are two questions here 
which must be considered. The first is how it is possible to assess the success of an indirect 
test, and the second is how an indirect test differs from a direct test. Allow me to start with the 
first question by using an example of what I regard as an indirect testing procedure.  
 I have argued that an indirect testing might be carried through when the reconstructed 
concept has been taken as point of departure for empirical research. One of the most 
sophisticated attempts to operationalise the concept of communicative action is the discourse 
quality index (DQI). It is an attempt to capture all the elements of Habermas’ discourse ethics 
in a quantitative analysis of speech. If successful, this kind of analysis might be seen as a 
corroboration of the theory. But what is the measure for success here? The DQI is 
operationalising Habermas using 6 indicators: participation, justification, common good 
orientation, respect, constructive politics and authenticity (Steenbergen et al. 2003:25-26). 
Summing up their approach they state the following: “While we acknowledge the importance 
of authenticity for deliberative theory, it causes the greatest difficulty from a measurement 
perspective”. However they think that apart from authenticity, “all other elements of 
Habermas’ discourse ethics … find a place within our DQI” (Steenbergen et al. 2003:26).44 
Thus their initial solution has been to leave authenticity out of the attempt to operationalise 
Habermas.  
 This is an interesting example. On the one hand, dropping authenticity might be taken 
as an example of an unsuccessful application of a theory, which means that we should not see 
the reconstructed hypothesis as corroborated. On the other hand, the DQI has been used in 
many interesting studies of deliberation, despite its obvious blind spots. Thus, deciding what a 
successful indirect testing requires is a difficult question. Furthermore, in a recent article the 
group behind the DQI has recognized the problem of dropping authenticity turning to how 
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 I appreciate clarifying conversations with Kjartan Koch Mikalsen on this issue.  
44
 Note that by Habermas’ discourse ethics the authors seem to be referring to his general theory, and not his 
moral philosophy. 
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that problem might be solved (Bäcthiger et al. 2010). We don’t need to go into the detailed 
argument here. It is sufficient to say that if this problem at least in principle can be solved, 
and a comprehensive operationalisation of reconstructed concepts can be established, that 
would serve as a satisfying corroboration.  
 Thus, in order for an indirect test to corroborate reconstructed concepts such as 
communicative action, empirical research must be established utilizing the reconstructed 
conceptual apparatus and the soundness of the operationalisations must be evaluated. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to carry out such an evaluation. However, much of the 
research carried out has been sound enough to suggest that Habermas’ concept of 
communicative action to a certain extent must be considered indirectly tested and partially 
corroborated. In section D below I shall use this conclusion to argue against Mattias Iser who 
claims that the empirical testing of Habermas’ research has not been carried out.    
Based on this we can return to the second question. The examples above constitute 
what must be considered indirect testing. It is indirect because it is not testing whether the 
assumptions built into the theory of communicative action are correct, but are instead testing 
whether empirical analysis based on the concept of communicative action can be carried out 
without “violence and distortions”.  
By contrast, a direct testing would look for hypotheses within Habermas’ theories and 
subject them directly to tests using standard social scientific tools such as interviews and 
surveys. One example of such a direct test would be to focus on Habermas’ claim that, in 
modern constitutional democracies, the normative self-understanding revolves around the idea 
of citizens governed by laws given by themselves. This hypothesis could be tested directly, 
for example, through some kind of in-depth interviews which where designed to capture the 
citizen’s normative self-understanding. If these interviews where to give a picture of the 
citizens normative self-understanding which contradicted the reconstructed normative self-
understanding as reconstructed by Habermas, that would weaken the reconstructed hypotheses 
through a direct test procedure.45   
But even though my analyses have tried to show how one might see Habermas’ 
research program as corroborated, by being used as input in empirical theories, there are still 
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 Note that Habermas claims that it is not possible to falsify the reconstructed hypotheses directly because they 
describe constitutive conditions for a certain practice (article 2 p 402-403). Yet Habermas also claims that 
research in constitutive presuppositions is “assuming more and more features of empirical research the more we 
depart from the level of generalized cognitive and linguistic practices and approach presuppositions of 
institutionalized and more or less conventional practices” (Habermas 2005:385). This means the hypotheses 
regarding the generalized cognitive and linguistic practices (for example the theory of communicative action) 
cannot be falsified, whereas the hypothesis which aims to make explicit the citizens normative self-
understanding can be falsified through a direct test procedure as the one described above.    
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many questions to be answered. What kind of corroboration is this? Which research program 
is corroborated? I have argued that it is the theory of communicative action which is being 
corroborated, but that research program includes formal pragmatics as well as the theory of 
social evolution. And after all, the research is carried out within one of the other fields which 
Habermas has contributed substantially: the theory of deliberative democracy. That means 
that in a certain sense three of Habermas’ research programs are being corroborated through 
empirical research carried out in the field of empirical approaches to deliberative democracy. 
I can not discuss these questions here, but simply note that much remains to be done within 
this area.   
Based on this outline of the reconstructive sciences and the method of rational 
reconstruction, which taken together are introduced to detranscendentalize reason, I would 
like to discuss what I have referred to as the philosophy/science interplay. We have seen that 
according to Habermas, there is no philosophical method, no particular object domain left for 
philosophy. Instead, the philosopher takes on the role as a stand in (Platzhalter) for empirical 
theories which make strong (universalistic) empirical claims. If I understand Habermas 
correctly here, the philosopher’s job is to transform and synthesise the different claims put 
forward by the reconstructive sciences, in the way we have seen Habermas do with Chomsky, 
Piaget and Kohlberg. They are all involved with understanding universal competencies in 
interrelated areas such as cognition, language and interaction. For instance, Chomsky is read 
as a figure who has introduced a “genuinely philosophical idea” into his field of research, 
allowing Habermas, as philosopher, to pick it up, transform and synthesise it with other 
genuinely philosophical ideas, like the ones found in Piaget and Kohlberg.  
 But the complex interplay between philosopher and scientific research also includes 
another dimension. The social scientist shall be able to employ the rationally reconstructed 
concept as a point of departure for empirical research. Here, the best example is, as I have 
argued above, probably the empirical research that has been carried out by various political 
scientists who attempt to operationalize the concept of communicative action. The indirect 
testing of rationally reconstructed hypotheses can, according to my interpretation of 
Habermas, be achieved when this is done.  
 Thus the “delicate relationship” between philosophy and empirical science is twofold. 
First, the philosopher enters into cooperation with the reconstructive sciences making it 
possible to establish a general theory, like the theory of communicative action. Second, when 
these theories, which have hypothetical status, shall be tested, it involves a somewhat 
different relationship with the empirical sciences. In that case, the scientist uses the 
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reconstructed concept as starting point for his own empirical research, searching for 
possibilities for operationalisation, for example, of the theory of communicative action. If 
such a study reveals interesting results from an empirical point of view, this is taken as an 
indirect test of the validity of the reconstructed concept (communicative action).  
 This conception of the philosophy/science interplay does not lead to dissolution of 
philosophy, but on the contrary involves a “philosophization of the science of man” 
(Philosophischwerden der Humanwissenschaften) (Habermas 1990 a:15).46 According to the 
interpretation I am giving here, this philosophization of the science of man can perhaps best 
be grasped if it is presented as a two step process: First, with Habermas’ encouragement and 
particular reading of what he refers to as reconstructive sciences, who defends strong 
universalistic claims thus introducing a genuine philosophical idea. These research programs, 
which include not only Chomsky, and Piaget, but also the work of Freud, Durkheim, Mead 
and Weber are genuinely philosophical ideas inserted “like a detonator into a particular 
context of research”. These programs bridge the gap between philosophy and empirical 
research because “a philosophical idea is present in embryo while at the same time empirical, 
yet universal questions are being posed” (Habermas 1990 a:15). Thus, this interpretation of 
the classics in social science focuses particularly on the philosophical aspect already operating 
within a specific scientific paradigm.  
And second, in my interpretation, Habermas considers his own theory of 
communicative action along the lines of the above mentioned research programs. The 
philosopher reconstructs key concepts for the social scientist (in close cooperation with the 
reconstructive sciences), but the validity of these concepts must be confirmed through their 
success in social science. This second step comes closer to standard empirical research in 
which the scientist tries to operationalise philosophical concepts (such as communicative 
action), and search for the right methods available for the given case. For example, as argued 
in article 2, a combination of document analysis, participant observation and interviews might 
interestingly illuminate the degree of which communicative action is involved in decision 
making procedures.47 Or, as argued above, a quantitative study of speech rooted in the theory 
of communicative action might give valuable information about the quality of deliberation. 
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 As Brunkhorst has noted, this is one of the motives in Habermas thinking which goes back to Marx who ones 
famously wrote about the realization of philosophy through the philosophization of reality (Brunkhorst: 
2009:218) 
47
 Again, this kind of procedure would amount to an indirect testing because it is not testing whether 
communicative action is operative, but merely using it as a point of departure for empirical research.  
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Thus, on the bases of both of these steps, the dialectic relationship between philosophy and 
social science once envisioned by Horkheimer can be achieved. 
The above argument focuses on the role of philosophy as stand-in for empirical 
sciences that makes strong empirical claims. Philosophy can no longer sustain its position as 
judge, that is, as equipped to have the conclusive word when it comes to knowledge claims 
put forward by the different sciences. And neither can it function as an usher (Platzanweiser) 
that is, as an instance telling the sciences what they should focus on. Instead, philosophy must 
find its position as stand in and as interpreter.  
To emphasise the dual function of philosophy is important because Habermas does not 
equate philosophy with rational reconstruction, even though he sometimes writes as if that is 
the case. Instead he regards the hermeneutic, interpretative function as equally important (cf. 
Hedrick 2010:101). As an interpreter the philosopher can function as mediator on behalf of 
the lifeworld, holding on to a totalizing perspective against the compartmentalization of 
knowledge into different value spheres as described by Weber. As interpreter operating from 
a participant’s perspective, the philosopher can mediate and help balance the separated 
moments of reason characteristic of modernity.  
 
   
 
 (C) THE FOUR ARTICLES 
 
In the first article, Habermas’ method: Rational reconstruction, the ambition was primarily 
threefold: to point out why Habermas has found it necessary to introduce what he refers to as 
an alternative paradigm based on the method of rational reconstruction; to clarify what the 
main characteristics of the method are; and to point out how the method is employed in two of 
Habermas’ research programs, formal pragmatics as well as the theory of social evolution. In 
addition to this, I pointed out a tension in Habermas’ project, a tension between his 
reconstructive and transcendental approach.  
 The method of rational reconstruction is, according to my analysis in this article, 
chosen due to the ambitions Habermas had. The ambition was to establish a paradigm which 
should be capable of describing normative resources inherent in different social practices, thus 
establishing a critical theory. It was therefore necessary to come up with a theoretical 
alternative which was capable of this, and Habermas thinks that neither the scientistic nor the 
hermeneutical approach to social phenomena have the resources available for such a task. 
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Somewhat simplified, we may say that the empiricists are committed to the descriptive and as 
a result do not aim at a critical function, whereas traditional hermeneutics lack fundamental 
criteria to serve as a basis for critique. 
 Thus a rational reconstruction was necessary. The method has the following 
characteristics: Under investigation is reality as symbolically structured. The objective is to 
reconstruct the deep structures which are considered as preconditions for different social 
practices. This reconstruction aims at uncovering universal competences in competent 
language users, as well as the collective knowledge of traditions. What is to be uncovered is a 
pre-theoretical competence, a competence of which the actor is not reflexively conscious. 
Since these kinds of investigations are dependent on a posteriori knowledge, rational 
reconstruction must be described as an empirical science: a science which is critical, 
constructive and theoretical all at once. Rational reconstruction as methodical attitude aims at 
a theoretical and methodical pluralism. The hypotheses which are produced are tested by 
using them as input in empirical theories. 
 Based on this method, Habermas first reconstructs how there are principles of action 
coordination written into language itself. There are, according to Habermas, some 
presuppositions in language which we cannot deny without committing a performative self-
contradiction. Leaving the technicalities aside, this means that when interlocutors enter into a 
discourse, there is a normative pull operating in language, a pull which instructs the parties to 
let themselves be bound by the force of the better argument. Communicative action is action 
where the parties are prepared to be persuaded by the force of the better argument. Habermas 
is of course aware of the fact that most discourses never realize this, but he nevertheless 
claims that we must presuppose such an ideal if discourse shall make sense at all.48  
 The investigations carried out in formal pragmatics constitute what I have referred to 
as a synchronical reconstruction. According to Habermas, there is an element of 
communicative action in every context. But the degree of this kind of action coordination will 
differ in different contexts. Therefore a diachronic reconstruction is necessary demonstrating 
how the intersubjective structures localized in common lifeworlds both make possible and 
limit communication. This is because the lifeworld constitutes a reservoir of common 
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 I believe there is a fundamental flaw in the way I introduced Habermas’ transcendental- pragmatical argument 
in this article. I argued, on page 471, that Habermas claims that it is beyond doubt that there is communication 
oriented towards agreement, and that it follows that the ideal speech situation exists. I did not make a distinction 
between the existence of something and the fact that we have to presuppose something. The transcendental-
pragmatic argument Habermas develops does not argue that the ideal speech situation exists, but that we cannot 
deny certain presuppositions without committing a performative self-contradiction. I appreciate clarifying 
discussions with Anders Molander on this topic.    
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meaning upon which we draw in everyday communication. This diachronic reconstruction 
involves learning processes in two different, but related domains: the cognitive technological 
domain and the moral-practical domain. In the latter, the possibility for communicative action 
is decisive. This is where social integration can be secured, and Habermas reconstructs the 
logic learning processes in this domain might follow.   
 The status of rational reconstruction is discussed with reference to how the hypotheses 
produced by rational reconstruction can be tested. In this article the criticism I presented can 
be summed up as Habermas’ empty fallibilism. The argument was that there is a tension in 
Habermas’ work between the method of rational reconstruction, which claims to be an 
empirical science, and the particular kind of transcendental argument employed by Habermas. 
The problem I was pointing at was that it is not sufficiently clear what it means to say that the 
hypotheses derived through rational reconstruction can be tested “by using them as input in 
empirical theories”. Based on this, I concluded saying that “Habermas’ fallibilism remains 
unspecified and without clear content”, and that it is “difficult not to see the argument as a 
form of transcendental argument in disguise” (Article 1:480).  
 In the second article, Habermas and the political sciences: on the relationship between 
theory and practice, I demonstrated how the ambitions Habermas has for his method can be 
traced back to some of his earlier writings on classical political philosophy. With rational 
reconstruction Habermas hopes to be able to unite theory and practice through a mode of 
analysis which is descriptive and normative at the same time. I then proceed to sketch what 
rational reconstruction is49 and subsequently show how the method is employed in Habermas’ 
theory of deliberative democracy. In the last sections of the paper I present a critique of the 
“stiff dichotomies” prominent in Habermas’ work, and discuss whether empirical design can 
reduce some of the problems that follow from this. Finally, on the basis of these reflections 
from an empirical point of view I discuss the tension between Habermas’ rational 
reconstruction and traditional empirical approaches. 
 In Habermas’ opinion, theories of the political have taken a problematic turn since 
Hobbes. The focus on practical questions able to give an orientation to what is right and just, 
which was so prominent in the times of the writings of Aristotle and other classical thinkers, 
has, since Hobbes, given way to a scientification of the political. With this move, the practical 
orientation of classical politics is lost. Habermas wants to address this by providing an 
account of politics which is capable of delivering insight with regard to what is right and just, 
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 This section is only slightly different from the characteristic features of rational reconstruction outlined in 
article 1.  
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while at the same time upholding the rigorous standards of modern scientific knowledge. A 
decade later, he finds the solution to this challenge: rational reconstruction, the method he 
also uses in his most systematic contribution to political theory Between Facts and Norms.      
 Habermas’ “two track model” of legitimate politics draws a crucial distinction 
between strong and weak public spheres, claiming that according to the implicit normative 
self-understanding of democratic constitutional states, legitimate lawmaking is dependent on a 
well-functioning flow of arguments from the latter to the former. A system of rights which 
guarantees both private and public autonomy is a necessary precondition for this kind of 
action coordination. 
 The rigid dichotomies in Habermas’ work are the point of departure for a gradualist 
critique claiming that empirical approaches which operationalize Habermas’ concepts can 
overcome some of the problematic aspects such dichotomization entails. The concept of 
communicative action is taken as a point of departure. It is a critical normative concept, but it 
is not clear how it can be utilized in empirical research, and it is not clear how communicative 
a process needs to be in order to be considered legitimate. Thus I argue that for empirical 
purposes, it is necessary to establish an operational threshold, and to operationalize the 
concept of rational consensus, which is the outcome of a genuine communicative process. 
Based on this, I suggest that textual analysis, participatory observation and interviews can 
make it possible to evaluate actual political processes, and at the same time open up for a 
more gradualist understanding. 
 In the final section, I return to the status of rational reconstruction in a discussion on 
the testability of the fallible theory. I first show how empirical research can never falsify the 
constitutive presuppositions discovered through rational reconstruction. In Habermas’ 
opinion, the point of empirical approaches such as the one described above is rather to find 
out to what degree an actual deliberative process can live up to the presuppositions inherent in 
a given practice. I conclude by stating the importance of Habermas’ approach as it leads our 
attention to the necessity of idealizations for social practices. I nevertheless repeat some of the 
criticism discussed in the previous paper claiming that it is not clear how to test reconstructive 
hypotheses.       
 In the third article, Social philosophy: a reconstructive or deconstructive discipline, I 
wanted to present the method of rational reconstruction as a transformation of the original 
program Horkheimer established for critical theory in the early 1930’ies. The article is at the 
same time a discussion of social philosophy as a discipline focusing on the social philosophy 
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of Horkheimer, Habermas, Foucault and Honneth.50 Thus this article differs structurally from 
the two first articles, which are throughout related to the method of rational reconstruction. 
Still, the method is central in this article, and I also think it holds important comparative 
insights in discussing Horkheimer, Honneth and Foucault against Habermas. 
 Max Horkheimer’s inaugural lecture at the Institute of Social Research has continued 
to influence critical theorists of the Frankfurt School. Horkheimer claimed that social 
philosophy – the term initially used to describe the activity at the institute – should be 
normative and descriptive, and at the same time establish a dialectical relationship between 
philosophy and the empirically oriented sciences. According to Horkheimer, philosophy 
should distinguish itself from the specialized sciences through a focus on society as a whole. 
Totality was conceived of as a regulative idea, and focus on totality should be realized 
through interdisciplinary research. Importantly, Horkheimer, who at this point was more 
concerned to learn from the natural sciences than to criticise them, thought that philosophical 
questions had to be testable through empirical means. 
 My argument in this article is that rational reconstruction represents a fruitful 
transformation of this program. It enables the critical theorist to work both normatively and 
descriptively at the same time while the reconstructed core concepts also make possible a 
dialectical relationship between philosophy and the social sciences. The concept of 
communicative action is a critical normative concept describing constitutive ideals which at 
the same time can be used to normatively assess the quality of discourse. Furthermore, the 
concept is increasingly being employed by empirically oriented political scientists thus 
establishing a dialectical relationship between philosopher and social scientist. The analysis 
also points out how Habermas’ conception differs from Horkheimer’s because Horkheimer 
claims that philosophical problems must be testable through empirical means, whereas 
Habermas’ claim is that philosophical reconstructions can be indirectly tested when they are 
employed as input in empirical theories.  
 This interpretation suggests that the very fact that the reconstructed concept are being 
taken up and used as starting points in empirical theories is the confirmation of the theory. 
“Indirect” could then be taken to mean that the theory is corroborated, not in traditional 
empirical fashion, but instead through its successful employment as a fundamental concept for 
                                                 
50
 The article was written at a time when I was focusing on social philosophy as a discipline. Here in this 
introduction I will not focus on that topic but instead present what I regard as important in the context of my PhD 
project focusing on rational reconstruction as a method.   
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empirical research. Thus, in this article I defend Habermas against some of the criticism I 
directed against him in the previous articles.  
 The comparative analysis in this article might also contribute to some insight into the 
method of rational reconstruction. If we adopt a distinction introduced by Aakvaag (2009:36-
38), it becomes possible to distinguish between two different kinds of insights which result 
from such comparisons. First, comparisons might yield negative insights because we are made 
aware of crucial shortcomings to a theoretical perspective when it is compared with another 
perspective. Second, we might also obtain positive insights if we can combine the strengths of 
two different theoretical perspectives, thus enabling the development of a better theory. The 
comparison between Foucault and Habermas yields negative insights because it demonstrates 
Foucault’s “normative confusions”, to borrow a term from Nancy Fraser. However, it also 
yields positive insights because it argues that a reconstructive theory can employ 
deconstructive tools as they have been developed by Foucault and his followers. The 
comparison with Honneth primarily yields negative insights because it demonstrates that 
Habermas should have been less dismissive of the empirical insights of Foucault.  
And finally, in the forth article, Justification and application: the revival of the Rawls-
Habermas debate, the challenge from Rawls, the most important political philosopher of the 
twentieth century, is discussed. This article does not discuss rational reconstruction explicitly. 
Its contribution to the overall discussion in this dissertation is twofold. First, it continues the 
comparative approach, assessing the strength of Habermas’ project against other social 
theorists in the same fashion as the Foucault/Honneth comparison. And second, it elaborates 
further on crucial aspects of Habermas’ political philosophy. In particular, it takes up the 
question of the system of rights discussed in the second article, and elaborates on this theme 
which was not satisfactorily treated in that paper.  
Both Rawls and Habermas start out by working up or reconstructing immanent 
normativety within given practices. Rawls does so by using the idea of society as a fair system 
of cooperation and the idea of the person as free and equal as provisional fixed points which 
can be taken as a point of departure for a construction of a politically freestanding conception 
of legitimacy. And Habermas does so through his reconstruction of pragmatical 
presuppositions immanent in discourse which subsequently can be applied to the legal form. 
The difference between these two strategies is not primarily to be found in the difference in 
terminology between reconstruction and construction, because both share the ambition of 
explicating inherent normativity. Instead, the difference consists in Habermas’ insistence of 
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this inherent normativity as necessary presuppositions which can serve as grounds for further 
reflections, against Rawls’ strategy which is not to ground, but to find a place to start.   
The comparison with Rawls is primarily interesting due to the radical challenge Rawls 
introduces to political philosophy in his second major work Political Liberalism. According 
to this challenge, a conception of political legitimacy must be freestanding due to the fact of 
reasonable pluralism in modern societies. Rawls claims that such a freestanding conception 
can not give an account of meaning, validity and truth without becoming a comprehensive 
metaphysical doctrine incapable of coping with the reasonable pluralism characterizing 
modern constitutional democracies. I argue that Habermas’ approach has the resources 
necessary to face up to this challenge because his approach can also be described as 
freestanding, although in a different way than Rawls. Thus, this article yields positive insights 
because it demonstrates that Habermas’ conception of political legitimacy is able to meet the 
challenge constituted by reasonable pluralism. At the same time it yields negative insights 
because it makes it possible to pinpoint several weaknesses in both Rawls and Habermas’ 
approaches.    
In the second section of the article I demonstrate how Habermas’ discourse principle 
(D), which represents a condensed formulation of the pragmatical presuppositions outlined in 
formal pragmatics, is applied to the legal form. Habermas regards the law as necessary in 
modern societies, and gives it a functional justification. Thus the system of rights is the result 
of the interpenetration of law and the requirement for justification of norms. The system of 
rights list a set of necessary presuppositions for subjects who wants to coordinate their lives 
through positive law. It constitutes a formal framework which must be filled in by the 
different legislatures in different constitutional democracies. 
 
D. OTHER APPROACHES TO RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION 
 
As hinted at in the opening section, it is possible to distinguish between two different 
generations of writers discussing the method of rational reconstruction. In the first generation, 
prominent philosophers like McCarthy, Baynes, Peters and Alford presented and discussed 
the method’s characteristic features primarily from a sympathetic point of view, perhaps with 
the exception of Alford’s rather harsh criticism. In the second generation, younger, less 
prominent, but probably more interesting work has been produced by Gaus, Iser, Celikates, 
and Hedrick.  
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 In this section I shall discuss two of these approaches, those of Iser and Gaus. Iser’s 
book Empörung und Fortschritt. Grundlagen einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft, 
focuses on reconstructive social criticism, thus discussing the method of rational 
reconstruction in an interesting way.51 Gaus’ book, Der Sinn von Demokratie raises the bold 
claim that Habermas’ project in Between Facts and Norms is not at all about social criticism, 
but should instead be understood as part of a descriptive enterprise.   
  Overall, Isers’ book has two main motivations. First, he compares reconstructive 
criticism, developed by Habermas, Honneth and himself to be superior to competing 
paradigms such as constructivist critique (Rawls), interpretive critique (Walzer), 
worlddisclosing critique (Rorty), critique of ideology (Marx, Bourdieu) and genealogical 
critique (Foucault).52 And second, Iser claims to be the first to systematically compare the 
critical theory of Habermas and Honneth, and subsequently claims to develop a position 
which mediates between the two. Thus, the position Iser defends is called a theory of 
communicative recognition. I shall not focus on these motivations here, but instead discuss 
how Iser describes the reconstructive critique.  
Iser starts out by drawing a familiar distinction between immanent or internal, and 
transcendent or external criticism. Immanent criticism is critical based on standards drawn 
from the very practice it criticises. It is critical in demonstrating how these standards are not 
fulfilled. Transcendental criticism, on the other hand, is critical based on norms which deviate 
from standard values operating in a given practice (Iser 2008:9). On Iser’s account, one of the 
strengths of Habermas’ position is that it effectively unites the strength of both types of 
criticism.      
According to Iser, the approach shared by Habermas and Honneth is the left-Hegelian 
focus on ideals inherent in social practices. Both focus on constitutive ideals which can be 
reconstructed and used as starting point for critique. In the case of Habermas, this ideal is 
communication oriented towards understanding (Verständigung) whereas in the case of 
Honneth it involves a reconstruction of conditions of recognition (Anerkennung). 
Furthermore, both Habermas and Honneth incorporate the idea of transcendence from within. 
Communication oriented at understanding and recognition are ideals which are operative in a 
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 This section draws on my essay written on Isers book (Pedersen 2009). In addition to the book by Iser, I shall 
also be referring to two other texts by Iser on rational reconstruction (Iser 2004 and 2009).  
52
 Reconstructive criticism is considered superior for two reasons: First, it incorporates a criticism which is both 
immanent and transcendent at the same time. This is the moment of innerwordly transcendence considered 
above. And second, it is the best form of criticism because it allows the theoretician to incorporate the other five 
types of criticism in a fruitful way. I consider Iser’s argument on these two points as very convincing.  
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given practice, but at the same time points beyond this practice to have universal validity (Iser 
2008:13).  
 The diachronic aspect of reconstruction is also important for Iser. Both Habermas and 
Honneth demonstrate how the reconstructed ideals (Verständigung, Anerkennung) can be 
realized to different degrees depending on the development a given society takes. 
Reconstructive social criticism can criticise processes of development which do not fully 
realize the possibilities available for communicative action and recognition (Iser 2008:294). 
But in order to provide a sufficient framework for a critical theory of society, the theory must 
also be able to account for the indignation (empörung) subjects feel when they are 
systematically denied access to communicate, or misrecognized. 
 According to Iser, the method of rational reconstruction shall fulfil three tasks: 
1. It shall justify the normative standards of a critical theory of society 
2. It shall demonstrate the development from pre-modern to modern society as a process 
of progress 
3. And third it must diagnose the potential for resistance (Wiederstandspotensiale). (Iser 
2009:364, my translation)    
 In my opinion, Iser has produced an illuminating analysis of reconstructive critique. In 
particular I believe his project reveals interesting features about how a reconstructive 
approach can function as a foundation for a critical theory. But Iser’s analysis primarily 
focuses on the relationship between communication oriented at understanding and 
recognition, not on a discussion of how these ideals are established methodically. Thus, there 
is no discussion in Isers book of the particular problems involved in making the implicit 
explicit, or how to put reconstructed ideals to test. I shall argue that this has serious 
consequences as he abstains from discussing Habermas’ reliance on the reconstructive 
sciences as well as the dialectical relationship between the philosopher and the social 
scientist.  
 In particular, Iser does not seem to be aware of the many empirical approaches which 
start out from Habermas’ concepts. He writes: “Habermas has for sure only sketched this 
ambitious research program. The necessary empirical testing and concretization has not been 
carried through” (Iser 2009:366, my translation). In my opinion, this is, as we have seen 
above, not correct. The extensive use of Habermas’ key concepts in political science is the 
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best example in this respect. Thus, my claim is that Iser fails to grasp the complex 
philosophy/science interplay, and draws the wrong conclusions from his analysis.53   
 At the same time however, there is also something correct about Iser’s diagnosis of 
Habermas’ research program. In my argument I have focused on the way the theory of 
communicative action has been employed increasingly within deliberative approaches to 
democracy. Thus, if my analysis is correct, this is the indirect corroboration of the theory of 
communicative action. But Habermas’ ambitious research programs include a set of other 
theories and a range of other hypotheses which are also in need of further corroboration. And 
it is not always easy to see how that can be achieved with the other research programs 
Habermas has developed.  
 Gaus’ reading of Habermas focuses particularly on the sociological-explanatory 
approach in Habermas’ writings. Both Iser and Gaus argue that Habermas’ theory contains a 
claim to explain how social order is possible in modern societies (Iser 2008:93, Gaus 2009:9, 
33).54 The difference between the two approaches is, however substantial. Where Iser claims 
that the explanatory approach exists parallel to the reconstructive approach thus allowing 
Habermas to develop a critical theory (Iser 2008:93), Gaus claims that the reconstructive 
approach is in fact an explanatory project which should not be understood as a critical theory 
at all. Thus, where Iser’s project is from the very start designed to demonstrate how 
Habermas, through rational reconstruction, can establish a critical theory, Gaus’ project is to 
show that that is not the case. In my opinion, Gaus has developed an interesting and radical 
contribution to the literature of reconstruction. It is to this alternative we now turn. 
 Somewhat simplified, Gaus has two ambitions with his book. First, he develops an 
alternative reading of Habermas, and second, he utilizes this perspective to argue against the 
opinion that the EU cannot be legitimated on the ideal of the constitutional state. I will only 
discuss Gaus’ reading of Habermas here.55 This reading is radical because Gaus tries to 
demonstrate that Habermas’ theory is not to be understood as a normative or critical theory. 
He explicitly distinguishes his own approach from those standard interpretations which read 
Habermas’ theory as trying to construct an ideal standard which can be used to criticise the 
existing institutionalized reality, counting Iser among those who give standard accounts (Gaus 
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 One reason why Iser has reached this negative conclusion when it comes to the philosopher/science interplay 
is perhaps – and here I am probably too speculative – that the empirical approaches to deliberative democracy 
have mainly been carried through outside Germany as well as outside philosophy, primarily from the perspective 
of political scientists.    
54
 A somewhat similar approach focusing on the explanatory aspects of Habermas can be found in Aakvaag 2009 
and 2010.  
55
 I shall be discussing Gaus’ reading of Habermas based on the book already mentioned, as well as on Gaus 
2009 b.  
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2009 a:10). He also claims that this standard reading is problematic from the point of view of 
political science which can not fulfil its potential if this reading is not challenged. His 
proposal is to read much of Habermas’ political writings as reconstructive hypotheses which 
are in need of empirical testing (Gaus 2009 b:110).  
 The importance of Gaus’ interpretation is that he clearly demonstrates that Habermas’ 
work is not a normative theory in the traditional sense. Through a rational reconstruction of 
the normative self-understanding of modern constitutional states, Habermas explicates the 
meaning of the modern constitutional state operating in collective consciousness. According 
to this explication, the modern constitutional state represents the ideal of legitimate political 
power (Herrschaft) enabling the state to obtain both material reproduction and normative 
integration (Gaus 2009 b:125). However, there exists at the same time a continuous tension 
between this normative self-understanding and the functional imperatives operating in the 
economy and the administration. If I understand Gaus correctly, his point is that what I have 
said here remains on the descriptive level. Habermas empirically reconstructs the normative 
self-understanding operating in modern constitutional states, and demonstrates how this self-
understanding is in conflict with economic and bureaucratic imperatives.    
Thus, according to this reading, the modern constitutional state constitutes an 
institutional order which is capable of handling the need for social integration in modern 
societies. Habermas’ theory of the constitutional state must, in other words, be understood as 
an important part of Habermas’ general sociology where the ambition is to present empirical, 
as opposed to normative claims (Gaus 2009 b:110). Interestingly, Gaus points out that such a 
theory can still be normatively relevant because it provides the participants in practical 
politics with a “pool of reasons” without arguing in a practical or normative modus (Gaus 
2009 b:124, footnote 44). For example, one might suppose that participants in practical 
politics might use the reconstructed normative self-understanding as a point of departure for a 
critique of the factual circulation of power in a given society.  
The controversial aspect of Gaus’ reading is whether this entails that Habermas should 
no longer be understood as a critical theorist. It is one thing to say that Habermas is not 
following “a normative-practical type of justification”, and another thing to claim that his 
theory is not a critical theory, but rather a set of “reconstructive hypotheses used to explain 
the social reality” (Gaus 2009 b:124). Gaus forcefully manages to show that Habermas’ 
theory cannot be reduced to a mere ought. And he admits that it is difficult to distinguish 
clearly between the two types of justifications involved, one being normative and the other 
descriptive. Still, he claims that the crucial point is that the critical effect of a theory depends 
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on the confirmation of the reconstructed hypothesis.56 From this he concludes that the 
explanatory, empirical approach is the approach followed by Habermas.    
In my opinion, there are some problematic aspects with Gaus’ reading. In particular he 
claims that, according to Habermas:  
 
from communicative reason it is not possible to draw any normative 
conclusions. Instead, the term communicative reason reflect the fact that 
speaking and acting subjects unavoidably orient themselves according to 
certain ideal norms, even though these norms in concrete contexts can not be 
fulfilled. (Gaus 2009 b:114, my translation)  
 
This interpretation runs counter to my own interpretation which has focused on the normative 
pull operating in language. I have argued that Habermas explicates ideals operating in a given 
practice, and that he also wants to use these ideals as standards to evaluate how these 
standards are met in reality. According to Gaus, that is not the case.  
 If I understand Gaus correctly, he maintains that the hypotheses produced by 
Habermas’ reconstructions shall be put to the test by empirical social science. He suggests the 
following two hypotheses as of particular importance for political science: 
  
- the discourse-theoretical conception of the democratic constitutional state represents a 
part of the collective consciousness, that is, the normative self-understanding common 
for all collective organizations coordinated through law.  
- The concept of the constitutional democratic state as the answer to the demand for 
political legitimacy is not randomly chosen, but is instead a result of a social-
evolutionary learning process. It offers an answer to the question of social integration 
in modern complex societies and must be understood as complementary to other parts 
of the normative self-understanding such as the concept of justice and authenticity. 
(Gaus 2009 b:110, my translation) 
 
These are very interesting suggestions regarding which hypotheses can be derived from 
Between Facts and Norms. It would probably be possible to test such hypotheses through 
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 “Entscheiden scheint mir jedoch das Argument zu sein, dass der praktisch-politische “kritische Sinn” einer 
Theorie über das normative Selbstveständnis von Gesellschaften erst unter der Voraussetzung zur Entfaltung 
kommen kann, dass die theoretische Rekonstruktion ihren Anspruch der Repräsentation sozialer Sachverhalte zu 
bekräftigen vermag”.   
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standard empirical social science. As I see it one could, for example, assume that the core of 
the discourse theoretical conception of the democratic constitutional state is that it is 
constituted by citizens who are governed by laws given by themselves. Through interviewing 
and questionnaires for example it should be possible to find out to what extent people would 
refer to the constitutive ideals made explicit by rational reconstruction. 
As I see it, Gaus’ perspective can be utilized to clarify how the reconstructive 
approach can best be interpreted. It is possible to distinguish between three different 
suggestions:  
- First, we have what Gaus refers to as the standard reading of Habermas: according to this 
position, Habermas develops a standard version of normative theory which constructs ideals 
which can be read as prescriptions or guidelines for our actions.  
- Second, we have the position which claims that Habermas reconstructs a normative content 
implicit in a set of social practices. This normative content provides a standard against which 
actual practices can be evaluated. But it is not directly prescriptive in the sense of the first 
position.   
- Third, we have the interpretation of Gaus, emphasising the sociological-explanatory 
approach, claiming that Habermas is involved in a descriptive enterprise and not in the 
establishment of a critical theory.  
 As argued above, the strength of Gaus’ argument is in demonstrating that the first 
alternative is a misunderstanding of Habermas’ central claims. However, this is not sufficient 
to establish that the second reading should be dropped and replaced by the third explanatory-
sociological reading.  
The research program suggested by Gaus would provide important insights for 
political science as well as for other disciplines. However, I do not understand how such an 
approach could be in line with Habermas’ claim that the reconstructed hypotheses shall be 
tested indirectly by being used as inputs in empirical theories. To me this seems more like a 
direct testing of hypothesis found in the discourse theoretical conception of the legitimacy of 
the state. And the problem with such a direct testing would be that one could not falsify the 
reconstructed hypotheses directly because they describe constitutive conditions for a certain 
practice.57 Instead the indirect testing I propose focuses on how the reconstructed concepts 
can be taken as point of departure for empirical research, where the success of such empirical 
programs indirectly confirms the result of the reconstruction.  
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 See article 2, p 402-403.  
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However, this objection does not necessarily constitute a problem for Gaus’ reading. 
In order to demonstrate this, it can be useful again to draw attention towards some of 
Habermas’ later writings on this topic. As we saw above, Habermas pointed out that 
 
Research in constitutive presuppositions is part of conceptual analysis, a proper 
job for philosophers. However, such a philosophical analysis assumes more 
and more features of empirical research, the more we depart from the level of 
generalized cognitive and linguistic practices and approach presuppositions of 
institutionalized and more or less conventional practices (Habermas 2005: 
385).  
 
This could be interpreted as if it were the hypothesis resulting from conceptual analysis which 
should be tested indirectly by being used as input in empirical theory, whereas the more direct 
testing that Gaus suggests is a result of the presuppositions of more institutionalized practices. 
If this interpretation makes sense, it would thus be possible to develop empirical research 
along both of the lines suggested here, not having to choose the one instead of the other.  
But even if this argument is correct, I find it difficult to follow Gaus’ argument 
concerning the status of reconstruction as a kind of descriptive enterprise. After all, the testing 
that I propose is a kind of test which allows social scientists to distinguish between legitimate 
and illegitimate decision making procedures using the concept of communicative action. Such 
a procedure would obviously be regarded as normative in the sense that it yields a standard, 
and aims to criticise deviations from this standard. Therefore, it does not make sense to claim 
that the theory is either descriptive or normative; it is both, at the same time. Thus, the second 
position suggested above is the one I defend.58   
  
 
(E) MAIN CONCLUSION 
 
My argument in this introduction suggests that Habermas theory constitutes a successful 
transformation of Horkheimer’s initial program for a critical theory. It is descriptive and 
normative at the same time, and establishes a dialectical relationship between philosophy and 
social science. This argument runs counter to Mattias Iser who claims that Habermas’ project 
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 I have to admit, though, that some formulations in article 2 document that the distinction between the first and 
the second alternative was not sufficiently clear to me at the time of writing that paper.   
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has not been realised, and it runs counter to Daniel Gaus’ suggestion that we should read 
Habermas’ theory as explanatory, and not as a critical theory.   
Given this general conclusion, the criticism brought forward in article 1 and 2 must be 
modified. There, I argued that it was unclear how to test the hypotheses put forward by 
rational reconstruction, thus labelling Habermas fallibilism an empty fallibilism. I still think 
that Habermas is somewhat unclear on this point, but as suggested above, I now think that it is 
possible to save Habermas from that kind of criticism. This can be done by focusing on the 
success of the different research programs initiated by Habermas. In particular, I have argued 
that the extensive research within the field of empirical approaches to deliberative democracy 
can be taken as a corroboration of some of Habermas’ reconstructive hypotheses. And as 
argued above, I also find some support for this interpretation in Habermas’ writings. 
However, I have also argued that more work is required both when it comes to discussing this 
understanding of the status of reconstruction, but also regarding the question of what 
hypotheses it is possible to test from the other research programs Habermas develops. In 
addition, the quality of research within empirical approaches to deliberative democracy must 
be evaluated.  
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